Humankind Advancing, Vol.3, No.2 April 1992

CONTENTS

Editorial

Quotes from Machiavelli, from Davis, and from Sperry

Quotes from Ransdell and from Solzhenitsyn

From the Perspective of Political Philosophy
Greek Origins (containing quotes from Plato, translated by Jowett and by Cornford)
Contemporary Political Philosophy
Shadia Drury [The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss; discussion]
Leo Strauss [The City and Man; discussion]
[Thoughts on Machiavelli; discussion]
Quote from Dewan

From the Perspective of Sociobiology Quotes from Wilson and from Ghiselin
Quote from Eccles

Danger: the Legitimation of Deceit
Loyal Rue-- [The Saving Grace of Noble Lies; discussion]
Quote from Theobald

Alternative Solutions
Quotes from Burhoe and from Sperry
Quote from Casebolt

Thought in Action
Star Island Conference

Reflections (containing quote from Ratzinger)

Quote from Franck

References


Editorial:

In 1989 I received an invitation from the Institute of Human Values at the St. Mary's University in Halifax to attend a symposium discussing the implications of a recently published book: The Political Thoughts of Leo Strauss by Shadia Drury. I was unable to attend the discussions, but read the book, studied several publications by Strauss, and reread his sources in ancient Greek philosophy. If the disturbing conclusions drawn by Drury are true, our striving toward more sane and just solutions of our global problems may be in vain. -- I tried to find mistakes in Drury's work, or to cancel its impact on me; neither was possible.

That does not mean that Drury's interpretation is correct. Strauss is a master of ambiguity and self-contradiction; opposing points of view based on his work can be defended with equal success. According to Drury, this method is used intentionally to permit only a small number of persons with superior intellect to discover the truth he conveys to them alone. The masses, he believes, must be led by myths and untruths to prevent the dissolution of their dedication to decency and integrity, values which are fundamental for society's existence. Without a healthy society, however, there could be neither an elite of philosophers nor uninhibited inquiries into the nature of reality.

The inquiries of Strauss lead (or have been interpreted to lead) to the conclusion that Socrates was secretly on the side of the despised sophists (who taught success through the art of appearing honest while acting dishonestly) and that the only mistake of Machiavelli was that he defended deceit openly.

Other strands of thought in defense of deceit come from the side of sociobiology and from a symposium on science and religion. These views and their implications will be critically discussed.


For some time I never say what I believe and I never believe what I say; and if it sometimes occurs to me that I say the truth, I conceal it among so many lies that it is hard to find out.

Machiavelli

* * * * *
Let me close by reemphasizing a value that is especially dear to scientists: The habit of truth. Experience has taught scientists that in their area (in contrast to many other human activities) distortion of the facts does not pay, for nature always has the last word. The same value is also relevant for the problem of achieving a more just society.

Bernard Davis

* * * * *
A[n]... approach to the public support and role of science is envisioned in which science is upheld, not because it begets improved technology, but because of its unmatched potential to reveal the kind of truth on which faith, belief, and ethical principles are best founded. In the world view and truths of science we will find the best key to valid moral guidelines.

R. W. Sperry

* * * * *
Philosophy was not born in a serene and settled environment, but in the midst of conflicting ideas and disintegrating institutions. It was not a product of the "ivory tower," remote from the cares and concerns of ordinary life. It came into existence because men began searching for the high ground which would save them from the rising floods of intellectual confusion and social and moral catastrophe. It arose from the conviction that there was something seriously mistaken in the way men commonly thought and lived, and the hope for something superior to this. We often think of insanity as a deviation from what is intellectually or socially normal. Yet there are times in human history when the idea begins to grow that it is the normal which is insane, and that sanity must lie in some unusual or extraordinary way of thinking.

Joseph Ransdell
The Pursuit of Wisdom

* * * * *
The dividing line between good and evil does not separate one country from another one, one party from another one, nor does it separate one individual from another one; it goes right through the human heart.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn


FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Greek Origins (Based upon translation of Plato by Jowett and work on Plato by Cornford.)

The struggle between good and evil dominates all ancient myths; it is basic to human nature. With the emergence of critical thought, the question was raised what "the good" actually is.

Let us cut into the ongoing discussion at the the time of Socrates. The Sophists are roaming through Hellas, instructing, for adequate payment, rich young aristocrats how best to succeed in life. It is the appearance of being just that matters, they teach, not justice itself. Thrasymachus, for instance, argues that "the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust;" the just fares less well in contracts, pays more income tax than the unjust, is at a disadvantage whenever anything is being divided, and refuses to enrich himself when in an official position. Instead, he works conscientiously for the common good, neglects his own, and, in addition to his losses, "is hated by his friends and acquaintances for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man," especially when he is in a position of sufficient power and beyond punishment. The happiest man on earth is the tyrant.

Socrates is revolted by this kind of teaching, which would demean and destroy any society in which its principles are generally accepted. But how can he prove this? To whom can he turn for guidance? Philosophers preceding him were concerned with the ultimate nature of reality -- not with morals. The Gods of the Greeks (as described in Homer's great traditional poetry) accept bribes, are jealous, and display all other follies and imperfections of human beings. The political horizon of his time is the City State, preparation for war with other City States is the epitome of good citizenship, and aristocrats are the only persons with leisure and resources enough to acquire an education stimulating thinking (and are thus far superior to the common craftsmen and traders, not to speak of slaves). From this background Socrates steps forth, searching for the truth, the good, and the beautiful -- all of which he perceives as identical.

And from this background he is able to speak to us with relevance. It is he who invented the key that opened the prison of conventional opinion: the method of critical discussion based on reason.

Socrates refutes the sophists' position through the explanation that "injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship." In spite of the timeless validity of this contention, his friends and students challenge him to show more convincingly that human virtues are good in themselves even if they demand personal sacrifices. They want him to explain how an individual can be rewarded through his just and fair thoughts and actions alone -- independently of reputation or other rewards either by men or Gods (as is commonly taught).

In response to this request, Socrates fights his way through endless allegories and assumptions, in the process of which he builds an entire new State, the famous Republic. -- For us, in retrospect, he seems sometimes to get lost in inconsequential quibbles and to assert as precondition what he is supposed to prove. Further, even though he successfully and vividly portrays the tyrant not as the freest and happiest man, but as enslaved by fears and suspicions, Socrates appears still not fully satisfied with his efforts. -- In fact, at the end he seems to give up all attempts to show that virtue itself is a good, independently of reward; he describes dramatically how the virtuous are rewarded and the villains punished during life after death. Moreover, his ideal State seems far too restrictive and completely at odds with human nature.

Apparently, it is not possible to prove the superiority of a pure and blameless soul through logical argumentation. And yet, we are deeply moved by the genius of Plato's Socrates, who let's us see the truth that defies rational scrutiny; we see it as the wellspring of his assertions, of his allegories, of his images.

"And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with intelligence."

Likewise, in the search for the highest good, though it can neither be explained nor described, Socrates directs our understanding to its nature:

"The good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power."

It is impossible to read Plato's Republic without being touched by the sincerity of his search for the highest dimension of human nature. That impression is not diminished but becomes more powerful when reading contemporary political philosophy, including the interpretation of Socrates' imperfect logic as a clever trick to obfuscate his true position: agreement with the sophists.

At one point in his arguments, Socrates describes the human being as a composite of beast and man, both natures competing for dominion. Law and custom approve a conduct that "subdues the brutish parts of our nature to the human -- perhaps I should rather say the divine in us...."

Has this "divine in us" of which Socrates speaks been lost from our lives? -- Or is it just being neglected by contemporary attitudes?

- - -
The quotes used are from Plato (Jowett), pp.27, 36, 201 and from Plato (Cornford), p. 317.

* * * * *
Contemporary Political Philosophy

In her book The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss, Shadia Drury, introduces us not only to a political philosopher, but to "the founder of a movement, a school of thought, and even a cult," whose presence is still penetrating our culture, even after his death in 1973. His numerous books and articles are of great influence, and his zealous students and followers are leading professors in nearly all North American higher institutions.

Drury argues against those interpreters of Strauss' thinking who believe that it was he who put morality back into the theory of politics. It is necessary, she maintains, to read all of Strauss' work -- and to read each single page of his books carefully -- if one wishes to entangle his intentional contradictions and obfuscations. Strauss never introduces his main arguments at the beginning or states them at the end of his work, they are always hidden in the interior of his treatises. Further, he scatters his most incisive criticism of a topic or person among the pages of books or papers on other subjects, he uses words with a meaning different from that commonly associated with them, his silences are always intentional, and he expresses his own opinions through persons to which he apparently objects. Through this method, which is cleverly calculated, Drury claims, Strauss induces in one type of student conclusions opposite to those of another type of student, and only the most sophisticated scholar is able to penetrate to the core of his thinking.

Is that interpretation valid? An entire symposium of political scientists and other professors from the United States and from Canada, debated this question from different sides.

According to Drury, Strauss believes to have discovered in ancient philosophy a method he subsequently perfected for himself: prudent differentiation between exoteric (open) teaching, which is socially useful but based on myth, and esoteric (hidden) teaching, which is true, but dangerous and disruptive. -- "I will show that for Strauss," Drury writes, "religion and morality are two of the biggest but most pious swindles ever perpetrated on the human race. But paradoxically, there would be no human race were it not for these swindles.... (Strauss believes that morality depends on religion.)"

Drury objects that the truth is neither as dangerous as Strauss believes [it certainly does not consist in nihilism and the absence of all values], nor is a secret valueless belief system in the minds of the powerful without danger. In fact, Drury thinks that the latter is of far greater danger than an open search for the truth with the help of mutual error-correction.

Drury's criticism of Strauss further deals with:

1) His assumption of a large gap between "the wise and the vulgar"; reality points to a continuum.

2) Strauss's contention that the philosophers' lack of morals cannot endanger society, because his love of contemplation overrules the pleasures of the masses ( "eating, drinking, sex, and the pursuit of wealth and power") -- but both kinds of pleasures may be pursued simultaneously, and the craving for immortality may lead even a philosopher "to harm those who stand in his way."

3) Strauss's insistence on the need for two different sets of right and wrong, not only for the wise and the vulgar, but also for domestic and for foreign affairs. Drury objects that greatness is not a product of power alone, "but of power properly and rightly used." Decency and integrity are integral parts of greatness.

4) Strauss's differentiation between the gentleman (who has admirable qualities, but is simpleminded) and the "real man" who has thrown off all internal chains of civilization (to which he still prudently pays lip service) to return to the freedom of nature with its hard and cruel laws. -- It is unrealistic to assume that cruelty can remain hidden for a lifetime, unless every intuitive act or emotion is severely censured and avoided, making life unbearable. It is equally unrealistic to assume that inhuman conduct will be condoned by humanity.

But Drury not only maintains that it is impossible not to be found out, she also asserts -- with Socrates -- that virtuous living itself is a well-spring of happiness.

* * * * *
Leo Strauss

The City and Man. Reading Strauss directly, the first impression is that of meeting a genius. "Man's highest possibilities cannot be exhausted as long as there are still high human tasks."

Strauss speaks of a "universal purpose" as a new guiding beacon for "the most successful form of modern political philosophy," which is anchored in classical political thought, but which aspires to become "superior in truth and justice." -- But then he goes on to say that these hopes were shattered through political realities which showed that "no bloody or unbloody change of society can eradicate the evil in man: as long as there will be men, there will be malice, envy and hatred." Therefore, the "antiquated hope" for peace and justice on earth through the principles of the present United Nations would "endanger the very progress one endeavors to bring about." Aggression will be unavoidable unless it is assumed that all present boundaries are just, which is not the case. "The opposition of `We and They' is essential to the political association."

In The City and Man Strauss discusses first Aristotle, then Plato (and Socrates), and last Thucydides' history of warring Greece, with emphasis on the "virtue" of glory (though we might question the identification of virtue and glory). The concept of "justice," too, diverges from our present understanding of the word. Strauss calls the Republic "the most famous political work of Plato, the most famous political work of all times...whose theme is justice," but points out that the only view on the subject Socrates held in the Clitophon (Plato's discourse preceding the Republic) was that justice consists in "helping one's friends and harming one's enemies." -- In the Republic, that startling definition is but one of several alternatives discussed, and Socrates objects that harming human beings, like harming animals, makes them worse. -- But it is explained that "Socrates does not know of moral virtue as such: virtue is knowledge."

In the discussion of Aristotle's Politics, moral virtue is praised as guideline to "just and noble ends," which only the "morally good man" perceives. "The morally good man is the properly bred man, the well-bred man. Aristotle's political science is addressed only to such men."

Most thought-provoking is Aristotle's objection to democracy (which would lead to the rule of the poor and uneducated). To avoid the unrest that might otherwise occur, Aristotle describes the ideal city as consisting only of gentlemen and slaves. -- [Ominous comparisons are evoked to situations in some present industrialized countries in which a vanishing middle class is being replaced by a small crust of very rich individuals, manipulating pliable masses through the mass media.]

Does Strauss agree with Aristotle? -- He is silent.

Thoughts on Machiavelli

Equally inscrutable is Strauss's attitude regarding Machiavelli. Introducing his subject with a list of appalling crimes taught by the classic teacher of political expediency -- such as that secure possession of robbed territories depends on the murder of previous owners and the extermination of their families; that it is better to cause severe rather than light damage, and so on -- Strauss concludes: "If it is true that only an evil man will stoop to teach maxims of public and private gangsterism, we are forced to say that Machiavelli was an evil man."

The entire book on Machiavelli reflects this guarded attitude. It is Machiavelli, and he alone, who says that "the desire for acquisition is `natural and ordinary'," that "Great men call it disgrace to lose; they do not call it disgrace to win by deceit," and who councils that it is better to achieve one's aims through atrocities than not at all. But it is explained that Machiavelli "is the only philosopher who has lent the weight of his name to any way of political thinking and political acting which is as old as political society itself" and that he "proclaims openly and triumphantly a corrupting doctrine which ancient writers had taught covertly or with all signs of repugnance. He says in his own name shocking things which ancient writers have said through their characters."

Machiavelli's artful camouflage of the scandalous "realities" he transmits is discussed thoroughly and in detail. Among the diverse methods the political virtuoso uses is the skill of "mitigation" (the sweetening of a repugnant lesson by saying something praiseworthy about the same subject). E.g. while running down Biblical religion, Machiavelli uplifts religion in general, and while running down religion in general, he uplifts humanity and goodness, and so on -- leaving the reader at the end completely bewildered and struggling through a network of contradictions.

To those trying to penetrate to the core of Strauss' thoughts, critical questions become unavoidable. When the esoteric philosopher does state his own view, it will be asked, how far does he follow Machiavelli's example? -- E.g. in the introduction to The City and Man, Strauss states his conviction that as far as we can see, no worldwide community is possible, and that each society has no more important or urgent task than its own "self-preservation and self-improvement," but mitigates that statement immediately with the explanation that "self-improvement is not identical with wealth; wealth is not the panacea it has been thought to be: "affluence does not cure the deepest evils."

Most obscure is the discussion of "goodness" in Thoughts on Machiavelli. Ordinary people, Machiavelli says, because they lack the skill to "color [their] wicked actions" are necessarily forced to refrain from such actions to avoid punishment. Strauss enlightens the matter further by explaining that Machiavelli means that "because the people lacks responsibility for the common good [they] can therefore afford to be good;" they are not by nature good, however. "Goodness" or "incorruptness" is caused by fear and may even mean "vileness."

For anyone who regards responsibility for the common good as the most desirable quality a person can have, these explanations seem to lead into a world of darkness.

* * * * *
A sophisticated control system...can easily
change into a system bent on its
self-destruction.

E.M.Dewan
(Control System Engineer)


FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIOBIOLOGY

E.O.Wilson

The "altruist" expects reciprocation from society for himself and his closest relatives. His good behavior is calculating, often in a wholly conscious way, and his maneuvers are orchestrated by the excruciatingly intricate sanctions and demands of society. The capacity for soft-core altruism [the kind that does not lead to self-sacrifice] can be expected to have evolved primarily by selection of individuals and to be deeply influenced by the vagaries of cultural evolution. Its psychological vehicles are lying, pretense, and deceit, including self-deceit, because the actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real.

From: On Human Nature, 1978

* * * * *
M.T.Ghiselin

What passes for cooperation turns out to be a mixture of opportunism and exploitation....Where it is in his own interest, every organism may reasonably be expected to help his fellows. Where he has no alternative, he submits to the yoke of communal servitude. Yet given a full chance to act in his own interest, nothing but expediency will restrain him from brutalizing, from maiming, from murdering -- his brother, his mate, his parent, or his child. Scatch an altruist and see a hypocrite bleed.

From: The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex, 1974

- - -
It should be noted that both E.O.Wilson and M.T.Ghiselin have recently ameliorated their views on altruism. Scientists like Eccles and others (R.W.Burhoe, A. Montague, L.Margulis, C.J.Lumsden, and many more) have convinced them that genuine altruism is an important product of evolution that is indispensable for the further development and survival of humankind. -- Such an effect of debates among leading scientists and researchers proves the superiority of an open search for the truth over secrecy.

* * * * *
Sir John Eccles

(Neuroscientist and Nobel Laureate)

It is evident that the ordinary social life of well-meaning persons is a tissue of altruistic actions....[The sociobiologists' view of altruism and of human nature generally is] cynicism of a particular obnoxious kind. Instead of being the most gracious of human values, altruism is tainted with lying, pretense and deceit so that it is a monstrous hypocrisy....It would seem that Harvard is a sophisticated hell and that social insects are to be envied and admired.

From: The Human Psyche, 1980


DANGER: THE LEGITIMATION OF DECEIT

Loyal Rue (Professor of Religion and Philosophy)

The IRAS (Institute on Religion in an Age of Science) and AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science) cosponsored early in 1991 a symposium on "The Evolution of Deception," during which one of the speakers, Loyal Rue, expressed the conviction that "Western culture has expressed an explicit and consistent bias against deception."

That "bias," according to Rue, has its source in the belief that to deceive someone means to harm him or her. Yet, values and beliefs contributing to "personal wholeness" and "social coherence" -- both of which are interdependent and basic to a functioning humanity -- have their source in ancient myths. Such myths (which are specific to each culture but never absent) always merge "factual" accounts of the cosmos with value judgments.

During the last two centuries, science destroyed that unifying perception and caused the emergence of two mutually incomprehensible languages. Personal wholeness can be achieved by any belief system one chooses, but at the expense of social coherence. Alternatively, coherence may occur through agreement on value-devoid scientific facts, which leaves the individual torn and empty. -- As a result, Rue believes, only two options are left: either social anarchy, or an ideology imposed by a tyrant, no matter how incompatible with personal convictions.

However (and here the thoughts of Leo Strauss seem to be active), there is a way out: we have to revert to a "Noble Lie," i.e. "a well-bred and moral lie." Rue's suggestion is "to fabricate a vision of a world infused with value that is so imaginative and so compelling that it cannot be resisted." The problem is ultimately an esthetic one, a challenge to artists.

Most importantly, the lie must be so well constructed, that it cannot be found out, even by science. It must not consist in the revival of outdated cosmologies or unbelievable historical reports, but be based on the present understanding of reality. Nevertheless, it ought to be so powerful that it overrules narrow self-interest in favor of noble ideals. Such ideals must include, but reach beyond, the family, the nation, the race, and even humankind; they must evoke dedication to the earth on which we live.

The question immediately occurs why Rue would call such a vision a lie -- a question which he anticipates and answers: It is a lie, because 1) value is attributed to a valueless universe, 2) we believe in the truth of our present understanding of the world, while in fact it is only a "caricature," a distorted sketch of reality, and 3) "it contradicts the self-evident truth of self-interest."

From: "The Saving Grace of Noble Lies," 1991.

- - -
In contrast to Strauss (or his interpreters), Rue does not say that the sophisticated philosopher is able to see through such lies and therefore need not feel bound by them (though he appreciates their usefulness to guide and manipulate the masses).

Nevertheless, Rue's article is extremely disturbing. The legitimation of lying would lead to disregard of the boundary between "noble" lies and those that serve narrow self-interest; it would lead to the degradation of the general living standard (as can be observed wherever an "explicit and consistent bias against deception" is absent); most importantly, lies are not necessary. Rue does not take into account the decades of valuable work that has been done, of sacrifices that have been made, by outstanding thinkers and scientists of our time to achieve the goal he envisions -- based not on lies, but on a better and fuller understanding of reality.

Yes, the gifts of artists are needed to present that reality with an irresistible power and beauty, and yet no lie, however glamorously it is dressed up, can compete with the convincing magic of simple truthfulness.

* * * * *
Victory is waiting for those who are willing to face reality.

Robert Theobald


ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

R.W.Burhoe: We respond to the growing fears that the widening chasm in twentieth-century culture between values and knowledge, or good and truth, or religion and science is disruptive if not lethal for human destiny. In this split, the traditional faiths and philosophies, which once informed men of what is of most sacred concern for them, have lost their credibility and hence their power.... -- Ordinarily, in the evolution of human cultures, beliefs and practices about man's most sacred concerns necessarily have been integrated with the concurrent general beliefs and practices.... Failure to reintegrate satisfactorily has spelled the death of cultures or civilizations.

A...barrier is the fear that religiously satisfactory beliefs cannot at the same time be true.

From: Zygon Editorials.

* * * * *
R.W.Sperry: [A belief system] based in science is not an irreverent one....Much of the great humanistic teaching of the past would be little changed in its basic impact.... The "grand design of nature" as seen through the expanding eyes of modern science would appear already in its present form to contain as much to sustain the highest in man's religious and spiritual experience as do some of the comparatively simple metaphysical schemes that have had wide acceptance. A scientific approach would not lead to a rigid, closed scheme but rather to one that would continue to unfold indefinitely as science and understanding advance.

Present trends to the contrary, humanity needs to see itself in terms of something greater and more important than itself to give meaning and purpose to human existence.

From: Science and the Problem of Values.

* * * * *
C.Casebolt: Many people...have come to the awareness that, even if we reject certain ideas about God, we cannot abolish or reject the ground of being or the structure of reality. High religion and science are not incompatible. Religion should have no quarrel with accurate descriptions of reality; science does not oppose the elevation of the human spirit. An adequate moral guide should reflect this view.

From: Polaris for the Spirit.


THOUGHT IN ACTION

1992 Star Island Conference: Global Ecology and Human Destiny -- 25 July to 1 August 1992.

The 1992 Star Island Conference will bring natural and social scientific, philosophical, and religious perspectives to bear on questions about the Earth's environment. Speakers will consider what the future will bring and explore visions of how people ought to live that should be projected for people today and for future generations. Participants will explore what institutional resources -- religious, political, legal, economic, scientific, and technological -- are available to facilitate changes in behavior that will nurture and sustain our global environment.

Registration forms and further information available from Mrs. Bonnie Falla, Registrar, 810 1/2 N. 9th St. Allentown, PA 18102. Tel.: 215-432-8711.

(The focus of the conference will be on the new book manuscript by Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, Technology and Religion in Theological Perspective.)

Source: IRAS (Institute on Religion in an Age of Science) Newsletter, Oct. 15, 1991.


REFLECTIONS

For many years I was haunted by an account of a Catholic Priest describing his near-loss of faith in God.

"In a situation like this [severe temptation of atheism], what is in question is not the sort of thing that one perhaps quarrels about otherwise -- the dogma of the Assumption, the proper use of Confession -- all this becomes absolutely secondary. What is at stake is the whole structure. It is a question of all or nothing. That is the only remaining alternative; nowhere does there seem anything to cling to in this sudden fall. All that can be seen is the bottomless depths of the void into which one is staring." (Ratzinger, 1970)

The haunting aspect of the described experience is the complete absence of an alternative to the traditional faith of the author's world. Would he have believed in the reports of the Bible as an expression of evolving dimensions of the human mind -- which at the time no other words could have conveyed -- the described despair would be absent. He would feel secure and grateful, both for the gifts of the past and for the gifts of the present. He would pray to find the right words to transmit to his contemporaries the values we need to remain human -- the values that would make us co-responsible for the quality of our descendants lives.

But when I read Drury, Strauss, and especially Rue, I felt very close to the despair described by Ratzinger: it was the belief in humanity that was sliding away -- and nothing was left.

Rue writes about the truth and presents it as a lie -- simply because lying has become fashionable; it is the in-thing to do. It seems to have become not only permissible, but obligatory. Why else should he rationalize his truths as lies? -- Let's look at them one by one:

1) The vision of a world infused with value is a lie, because value is attributed to a valueless universe. -- Objection: The value of the universe consists in its creation (through the process of chance encounters of energy and matter) of life, mind, purpose, and meaning, including the deepest spiritual experiences -- all of which are now contributing to further evolution. It consists in its potential for as yet unknown and unimaginable new phenomena. As soon as the first sentient being, either human or pre-human, felt awe and reverence when contemplating nature, the world was infused with value. As soon as the first thinking mind recognized its connection with, and dependence on, the spheres of the earth and the rays of the sun, the value of the universe could be expressed in concrete terms. Before life and minds evolved, the concept of value was absent; but as soon as the first living being conceived of values, the universe was richer than it had been before. Value does not reside in the stones and ashes of the stars, it resides in the interaction of minds with the universe. -- And that interaction is part of reality.

2) We believe in the truth of our present understanding of the world, while in fact it is only a "caricature," a distorted sketch of reality. -- Objection: Our progressing knowledge may be compared with the changing perception from a rising airplane. The world becomes larger and more interconnected. From time to time our mental map has to be rearranged; what appeared as islands first are seen to be peninsulas of immense new territories. -- But the ascent takes centuries, and our mind is impatient and active all the time. It has to make sense of what it does not fully know, we are not constructed to be satisfied with a series of meaningless sense impressions (which would go on forever). For this reason, we have to accept whatever is accessible to us at a certain period in history as the truth to the best of our knowledge. This is the only kind of truth we can perceive and by which we must live. But it is not a lie; it is part of a larger truth -- and its credibility is determined by the circumference of our perception.

3) To feel responsibility and concern for our human future and that of our earth "contradicts the self-evident truth of self-interest." -- Objection: Many examples could be provided of persons who experience satisfaction and happiness through dedication to a goal surpassing their own lifespan, and for which personal reward is neither possible nor expected. Many of these persons are motivated not by expectation of reward in a life after death, but by the sense of being a part of evolving nature -- a nature that has produced wonders through blind, thoughtless, wasteful and cruel methods, and that is now beginning to see, to feel, and to think -- that is groping toward dimly perceived possibilities of an even more breathtaking kind.

Admittedly, such individuals are rare, but the most outstanding feature of the human mind is its ability to be influenced by other minds. To be receptive to wisdom is part of the characteristic of our species; to attach the name "lies" to the voices of reason and expanded concern is to kill the best of what humanity is capable of. -- Even the vision of an all-knowing, wise, and loving father -- if understood not in concrete terms, but as an ideal for humankind to strive toward -- is not a lie.

To legitimize deceit would destroy us. Genuine decency and integrity would be misinterpreted, even, and most of all, by the deceiver, in whose heart is no place for them. Pervasive mistrust would prevail, and our species would become valueless. No one would regret its loss; no one would prevent it.

* * * * *
Comment: On the basis of her research work "In Search of Values for Human Survival," the publisher and Editor of Humankind Advancing, Erika Erdmann, has been chosen to work on the International Advisory Board of the World Culture Project associated with UNESCO.


Frederick Franck: Whenever I have met true humanness, and it has happened often, I have been moved, often to the point of tears. Each time it has been a revelation to see it in a mere gesture or a glance, to hear it in a word spoken at the right moment.

From: To be Human Against All Odds.


REFERENCES

Burhoe, R.W. (1966). Editorials of Zygon Vol.1, No.1 and No.3.

Casebolt, C. (1982). A Polaris for the Spirit. Concern for the Fulfillment of Life Foundation, 8041 Hansom Dr., Oakland, CA 94605.

Cornford, F.M. (1967). The Republic of Plato. York: Oxford University Press.

Davis, B. (1976). "Evolution, Human Diversity, and Society." Zygon, 11:80-95.

Dewan, E.M. (1976). "Consciousness as an Emergent Causal Agent in the Context of Control System Theory." In Consciousness and the Brain, G.G. Globus, G. Maxwell, and I. Savodnik, Eds. pp. 179-198. New York: Plenum.

Drury, S. (1988). The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Eccles, J.C. (1980). The Human Psyche. New York: Springer International.

Franck, F. (1991). To be Human Against All Odds. Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press.

Ghiselin, M.T. (1974). The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Machiavelli, (1521). Letter to Guicciardini of May 17, 1521. In Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy; II, 13.

Plato (428-348 B.C.) The Republic and Other Works. Translated by B. Jowett. Garden City, N.Y.: Dolphin Books (Doubleday), 1960.

Ransdell, J. (1976). The Pursuit of Wisdom. Santa Barbara, CA: Intelman Books, p.61.

Ratzinger, J. (1970). Introduction to Christianity. New York: Crossroad. (Translated from Einfuehrung in das Christentum, 1968).

Rue, L. (1991). "The Saving Grace of Noble Lies." IRAS (Institute on Religion in an Age of Science) Newsletter, April 15, 1991.

Sperry, R.W. (1972). Science and the Problem of Values. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Autumn 1972.

Sperry, R.W. (1981). "Changing Priorities." Annual Reviews of Neuroscience, 4:1-15. (Reprinted in Science and Moral Priority.) New York: Columbia University Press, p.107. Reprinted in paper- back, 1985, New York: Praeger (now Greenwood).

Strauss, L. (1958). Thoughts on Machiavelli. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press.

Strauss, L. (1964). The City and Man. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Theobald, R. (1991). "Riding a Wave of Discontent." The Christian Science Monitor. Oct. 29, 1991, P.18.

Wilson, E.O. (1978). On Human Nature. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (Paperback edition: New York: Bantam Books)